This paper examines the intertemporal linkages between local government expenditures and revenues, In the terminology that has become standard in the literature on vector autoregression analysis, the issue is whether revenues Granger-cause expenditures, or expenditures Granger-cause revenues.
I. Introduction
The significance of intertemporal linkages between government expenditures and revenues has been discussed both by economists and political scientists. As von Jeong [1985, 1986] observe, three hypotheses have been advanced:
Revenues change concurrently with expenditures. Such a pattern would result If each year the citizens of a jurisdiction (or their representatives) simultaneously select taxes and expenditures using the standard calculus for weighing marginal benefits and costs. Theoretical models generating such behavior are Lindahi's [1958] model of benefit taxation, or the well-known median voter rule. (Black [1948] .) 2.
Taxes change before spending. To see how this sequence might emerge, consider a government controlled by individuals who want to expand its size beyond that desired by the citizenry. (Niskanen [1976) .) In the presence of statutory or constitutional rules prohibiting deficits, how can public sector managers increase spending? According to this story, the answer Is that they must wait for revenues to increase, and then increase expenditures.1 A state senator from New Jersey put it this way: "It is axiomatic that government spending will rise to meet and eventually exceed available revenues."2 However, nonsynchronous changes in expenditures and revenues need not be associated with any "failure" in the political process.
For example, taxes might change before spending if a community decides to save for anticipated future expenditures by raising taxes prior to the time those expenditures are made.
3.
Spending changes before taxes. According to this story, some special event creates a "need" for an Increase in expenditures.3 Rather than cut other expenditues, public sector managers convince voters that the only 1 way to balance the budget is through increased taxes. Buchanan [1960] notes that this view has a long pedigree; its proponents included members of the nineteenth century Italian school° of public finance. But just as in the case of hypothesis 2, this pattern can be rationalized by an Intertemporal decision-making model.
Each of the 3 hypotheses has a straightforward Implication In terms of the time series properties of expenditures and revenues. Under the second hypothesis, for example, one would expect to find that past levels of revenues help predict current expenditure levels. In the same way, according to the third hypothesis, past expenditures help predict current revenues. In the terminology that has become standard In the literature on vector autoregression (VAR) analysis, the issue is whether revenues Granger-cause expenditures, or expenditures Granger-cause revenues. We emphasize that in adopting this terminology, It Is not our Intention to take sides in the debate over whether vector autoregression results reveal anything about causalIty" In a philosophically meaningful sense. However, for the sake of readability, we will henceforth refrain from putting quotation marks around that word.
In two important recent papers, von Furstenberg, Green and Jeong [1985] , [1986] (hereafter FGJ) used VAR's to analyze expenditure and revenue data of the federal government. Their 1985 paper examined state and local spending as well. FGJ's basic finding was that taxes did not cause aggregate spending, but there was some weak support for the reverse sequence, that spending helps predict taxes.
As FGJ [1986] note, federal fiscal data may be Inappropriate for testing the various political economy hypotheses listed above: "... [O] nly that part of any change in fiscal magnitudes which is not accepted as part of cyclical or price-level stabilization designs can be expected to hold messages for the other side of the budget." Thus, VAR's "would be biased against finding support in past data for the...proposition that spending can be pulled along by prior tax action, unless changes in the average aggregate tax rates were adjusted for movements in cyclical factors and inflation" (p. 181).
FGJ's solution to this problem Is to adjust the cyclically sensitive time series for concurrent cyclical effects by regressing each one on the GNP gap and the inflation rate, and then using the residuals in subsequent VAR analyses.4 It's hard to think of a much better way to deal with this problem. Yet one wonders about its adequacy, particularly in light of the well-known difficulties in measuring the timing and severity of the business cycle. Just how does one measure potential GNP; is this a better measure than the deviation of the actual from the permanent rate of unemployment; etc.? In short, the fact that the federal government carries on its stabilization function concurrently with its other fiscal activities will tend to confound attempts to link intertemporal patterns in fiscal variables to various views of the budget process.
In contrast, state and local governments are not in the business of counter-cyclical policy. In their 1985 paper, FGJ examine fiscal data on the state and local public sector as a whole. Here the problem is whether it is appropriate to aggregate all state and local governments into one unit.
After all, the various governments differ with respect to the functions they perform, their budgetary processes, the political environments in which the operate, etc.
In this paper we apply VAR techniques to data from individual local governments to study the revenues-expenditures nexus. Hence, neither stabilization issues nor aggregation problems impede interpretation of the results. To anticipate our main conclusion, we find that past revenues help to predict current expenditures, but past expenditures do not alter the future path of revenues.
Typically, VAR methods are applied to relatively long time series. No comparable fiscal data for individual communities are available. We have assembled a nine year panel with information on 171 municipal governments.
VAR techniques can be applied to such data sets, but It requires confronting some Interesting econometric problems. These are discussed In Section II.
The results are presented In Section III, and Section IV contains a summary and conclusions.
II. Econometric Issues5
We begin by considering causality tests in their usual time series context. The issue is to determine the causal relationship between the detrended variables x and y, on which the investigator has a large number of observations. The variable x is said to not (Granger) cause the variable y 
where the &s and cS's are parameters and the lag lengths m and n are sufficient to ensure that ut Is a white noise error. While It is not essential that m equal n, we follow typical practice by assuming that they are identical. The test of whether x causes y is simply a test of the joint hypothesis that 51=52=•••=5m are all equal to zero. This can be done by using standard F-tests; a good example is FGJ's study of fiscal data.
To perform the test, there must be enough observations on x and y to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters in equation ( is correlated with the regressor (Yft1 -
The fact that differencing can induce a simultaneity problem is well known from the conventional literature on time series analysis and has been explored in a panel data context. (See, e.g., Chamberlain [1983] .) The usual solution is to employ an instrumental variables estimator. Here, too, this turns out to appropriate, but it is implemented in a different fashion than is typical. This is because, as we note below, the variables which are legitimate candidates for use as instrumental variables change over time.7
The most straightforward way to motivate an estimation procedure for the system (2.4) is to discuss its identification. The criterion we use for identification is that there must be a sufficient number of instrumental variables to allow estimation of the equation in question. This leads directly to an instrumental variables estimator which has a generalized least squares (GLS) interpretation.
We begin by assuming that, as usual, the error term, is uncorrelated with all past values of y and x, and the individual effect:
The orthogonal ity conditions (2.5) can be used to Identify the parameters of (2.4), since the disturbance term v. (= u.
-ujt_i) as right-hand side variables, it must be true that 2(t-2) > 2m, or t > m+2.8
Given our assumed lag structure, It Is Impossible to estimate the equations (2.4) for time periods before t = m+2. Thus, these equations are ignored. Clearly, the decision about which equations to "ignore" depends crucially on assumptions concerning lag length. If we make an incorrect assumption and truncate the lag distribution, the parameter estimates will be inconsistent. This creates a potential identification problem when the lag length is unknown. We do not present a general treatment of the problem, and instead use only the straightforward restriction Implicitly Imposed above:
that If the largest lag length is m, then the number of time periods T is greater than m-i-2.
These considerations suggest the following estimation procedure. Make some assumption on the lag length, m. Think of (2.4) as a system of (1-rn-i) where: rt = a = a0
Observe that in each of the equations in (2.7) there are 2(m+1) right hand side variables other than the constant, or a total of (2m+3). To identify the parameters of (2.7) an equal number of instrumental variables is required. Since the Instrumental variables vector is "lt-2'" it is now required that t m÷3 to have a sufficient number of instrumental variables for the equation for time period t. Thus, as one would suspect, allowing for time varying parameters makes identification more difficult.
Nevertheless, the basic estimating procedure discussed above can still be employed. Specifically, one can: i) choose a relatively large value of m to be sure to avoid truncating the lag structure inappropriately (we discuss below how to find the °best11 value of m); ii) estimate the model with and without parameter stationarity; and iii) compare the sums of squared residuals.
2.
What is the correct lag length, ni? Denote by rn the relatively large value of m used for initial estimation of the model. Re-estimate the system (2.4) or (2.7) (whichever is appropriate) with m = (m-1). If the increase in the sum of squared residuals is "large," then in = in is accepted.
If the increase is "sniall," then try in = (-2). Continue testing successively smaller lag lengths until one is rejected by the data, or m = 0. The Inclusion of grants in our analysis not only facilitates examination of our main concern, the revenues-expenditures nexus, but also allows us to gain insights into some other controversial aspects of local public finance.
In previous econometric investigations of local government expenditures, an The results presented here use total local current expenditures, total local revenues, and total grants received. Less aggregative work focusing on specific revenue and expenditure categories is presented in Holtz-Eakin [1986] .
C. Estimation and Testing
Our focus is on the dynamic interrelationships between three variables:
expenditures, revenues, and grants. First, we estimate a model in which expenditures appear on the left hand side, and on the right hand side are its own lags and lags of the other two variables. Next we do the same thing for revenues.12 The results are used to investigate issues of parameter stationarity, lag length, and causation.
Expenditures. We begin by estimating an equation with 2 lags of each of the right hand side variables; in terms of our earlier notation, m=2.13 The quasi-differenced version, then, has three lags. Given that in our data T=9, m=2 implies that we can estimate parameters for only the last five years in the data set; I.e., t=1976,...,1980. When the equations for these years are estimated jointly using the three-stage procedure described above, the minimized value of the x2 test statistic, which we denote Q, Is equal to 1.99, and has 30 degrees of freedom.14 (For convenience, this result and others to follow are summarized in Table 1 .) Now, Inferences about causality will be Incorrect If the lag distribution is incorrectly truncated and/or parameter stationarity is incorrectly imposed. In order to avoid these (type II) errors, we choose 10% significance levels for the tests on lag length and parameter stationarity, rather than the conventional 5% or 1% levels. Because the value of the x0 at the 10% level Is 40.26, we can easily accept m=2.
When we examined the coefficients of this specification, we noticed that most of them were quite small relative to their standard errors. To see if we could sharpen the results by putting more structure on the model, we imposed the condition that the coefficients on the Individual effects be stationary, i.e., that rt from (2.7a) be unity for all t. The value of Q from this restriction is 3.54. Therefore, the value of the appropriate test We next investigate results relating to lag length (conditional on the assumption that rt=1). The first question is whether the data will permit us to shorten the lag length from two to one. When we Impose m=1, the value of Q Is 19.03. Comparing this to the value of Q in line ii of Table 1 When we estimate the expenditures equation excluding grants, we find that Q = 32.72, L = 13.69, and the hypothesis of non-causality is again rejected, although by a smaller margin.
To summarize: We find that community expenditures can be described by a dynamic process which has only one year lags. The Individual effects are stationary across time periods, but the other parameters (taken as a group)
are not. Further, one can reject the hypothesis that revenues do not cause expenditures.
Revenues. The procedures for analyzing revenues are very similar to those for expenditures, which were just described In detail. We therefore briefly summarize the results which are reported in Table 2 Parameter Estimates. We next turn to an examination of the parameter Tables 1 and 2. Table 3 suggests the following thoughts:
1.
While the processes generating expenditures and revenues share the important characteristic of a stationary individual effect, they differ with respect to lag length and whether the lag parameters change over time. More coefficients are reported for expenditures than for revenues, because only for the latter are all the parameters stationary over time.
2.
In general, parameter statlonarity can be rejected for one of two reasons. Either the estimates are qualitatively "close" but are precisely estimated, or the parameters differ greatly in magnitude even If they are individually estimated without much precision. The former seems roughly to be the case In the expenditures equation.
3.
As noted earlier, the data suggest that expenditures do not cause There are a number of theories which attempt to explain non-responsiveness of this kind; such models tend to emphasize the costs that voters must Incur to obtain the relevant information and oust non-responsive incumbents. See, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglltz [1980, Chap. 10] .
2New York Times, New Jersey Weekly, March 17, 1985, p. 22. 3Most state and local governments face balanced budget rules, although it is not clear they serve as an effective limit on current expenditure. See Inman [1983] .
4More specifically, first differences in the variables are employed, and a dummy variable is Included to account for anomalous fiscal behavior in the year 1975.
5See Holtz-Eakln, Newey and Rosen [1985] for additional details on Identification, estimation, and inference in this class of model.
6The discussion generalizes easily to the case where there Is more than one right hand side variable.
7One should also note that heteroskedasticity is likely to be a problem in the panel context--different units may be expected to have error terms with unequal variances. Efficient estimation and correct formulae for standard errors require that heteroskedasticity be taken Into account.
8A sufficient condition for identification is that in the limit the cross-product matrix between the Instruments and the right hand side variables be nonsingular.
9A special case which may be of particular interest occurs when the a's and 6's are time Invariant, but $ is not.
10Alternatlvely, matching rates do not change the "reduced form" relationship, which is all that matters for Granger-causality. However, the matching rates are embedded In the coefficients, so they would have to be taken into account If one attempted to recover the coefficients of the underlying "structural model."
11To remain In the sample, communities had to report positive school expenditures.
12For the sake of completeness, we also estimated a model with grants on the left hand side. These results are available upon request.
13We begin at m=2 in order to estimate the covariance matrix necessary to test for this and other (including larger) lag lengths. However, it is obvious from the test statistic that the restriction m=2 is consistent with the data. This also turns out to be true for the revenues equation.
'4The calculation of degrees of freedom is as follows: For 1980, we have available 7 years of data for each variable (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) 
